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IN THE SUPRE:ME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
COM:MERCIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEWARK, NEW JERSEY,
a corporation,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a cor-

Case No. 9891

poration,

Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
Action by plaintiff insurance company to recover
from defendant, an intermediary bank which accepted
for collection for its depositor a settlement draft issued
by plaintiff bearing the forged endorsement of one of
two payees.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon trial of the case before the Honorable A. H.
Ellett, sitting without a jury, judgment was entered
against plaintiff and for defendant, no cause of action.
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RELIEF SOUGHT O,N APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the trial court's judgment, in opposition to appellant's request for reversal
of the judgment, or in the alternative a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts must be considered by this
Court in addition to those correctly summarized in plaintiff's statement of facts. The draft issued by plaintiff
on March 30, 1959, was transmitted to the insured, Alburn Holder, dba ((200" Motors, through the office of
Motor Club Insurance Agency, an agent of plaintiff, on
April 9, 1959. The endorsement of ((200" Motors was
authentic, but the endorsement of Keith Walton Body
Shop was forged prior to April 16, 1959, when the draft
was deposited to the account of ((200" Motors at the
Brigham City office of defendant bank. (R. 23) Keith
Walton Body Shop did not maintain an account of any
nature with the Brigham City office of defendant bank.
(R. 42) Several policies of insurance and bonds issued
to ((200" Motors by plaintiff were cancelled by reason of
nonpayment of premiums and termination of the business
of ((200" Motors in June, 1959. (R. 77) Prior to June 26,
1959, plaintiff through its Salt Lake City office advised
City Finance Company that the plaintiff's draft issued
March 30, 1959 in the amount of $624.96 had been paid
by plaintiff on the endorsements of Keith Walton Body
Shop and ((200" Motors, and that a copy of the draft
would be forwarded to City Finance Company. (R. 24)
At approximately the same time Keith Walton of Keith
Walton Body Shop informed City Finance Company that
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he had not received the draft and had not endorsed his
name thereon. (R. 24) No further inquiries regarding
the forged endorsement were made until after January
19, 1961. (R. 24) Defendant was not advised of the
forgery until July 18, 1961. (R. 25)
The repairs on the damaged automobile were not
completed by November 19, 1959, but on or about that
date, Keith Walton purchased the damaged automobile
from City Finance in an unrepaired condition by payment of $600.00. (R. 64) City Finance Company subsequently sued plaintiff on October 18, 1961, alleging a
loss of $624.96, the amount of the draft. On November
30, 1961, plaintiff paid City Finance Company without
having answered the complaint, and the case was dismissed. ( R. 2 5)
Alburn Holder, who had received the proceeds from
the draft bearing the forged endorsement, was released
from custody on bail on July 17, 1959, ~nd worked in
Atlanta, Georgia, until shortly before his trial and commitment to federal prison on February 8, 1960. (R. 24)
Defendant denied liability on plaintiff's claim for
recovery on the draft and the case came to trial on January 25, 1963. Following the introduction of evidence by
both parties the Court indicated that all evidence introduced without objection, and the issues raised thereby,
would have to be considered since the pleadings are deemed
to be amended to conform to the proof. (R. 100) At the
request of plaintiff additional time was offered by the
Court to permit additional evidence if plaintiff deemed it
necessary, but plaintiff requested no witnesses except those
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which had already been fully examined by both parties,
and, therefore, no continuance was granted. (R. 99, 100)
Judgment was entered in favor of defendant. (R. 14)
Plaintiff's subsequent motion to amend the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law was granted with respect
to the Findings of Fact. (R. 21)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM RECOVERY BY
LACHES.
The record of this case clearly indicates that plaintiff was guilty of laches by reason of ( 1) its failure to
act on the facts known by it and make diligent inquiry
which would have led to conclusive knowledge of the
forged endorsement, {2) its failure to notify defendant
immediately when plaintiff knew or should have known
of the forgery, and ( 3) its failure to notify other parties
who might have averted the loss, or to pursue the forger
in its own right if it suffered any loss. There can be
no question that shortly after the draft containing the
forged endorsement was returned to plaintiff it had
knowledge of the forgery or of such facts which should
have put it on inquiry regarding the forgery. As plaintiff's counsel emphatically stated in an opening statement
to the Court:
. . . and I would just like to alert the Court to this
factor at the beginning of the evidence that it will
not necessarily be when the forgery is committed
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but when the plaintiff had a duty to act in regard
to that forgery; ... (R. 40)
The record indicates that plaintiff's duty to act on
the forgery arose in June, 1959, well in time for recovery
of any loss from the person benefitting from the forgery.
The important sequence of events can be easily traced.
Plaintiff issued its draft in the amount of $624.96 on or
about March 30, 1959, made payable to cc200" Motors and
Keith Walton Body Shop. (R. 23, Par. 5) The draft was
mailed by the Motor Club Insurance Agency, an agent
of plaintiff, to cc200" Motors, the insured and one of the
payees, on April 9, 1959. (R. 71) Shortly thereafter, and
approximately May 20, 1959, Alburn Holder dba cc200"
Motors, went out of business. (R. 23, Par. 8) The policy
of insurance in the name of cc200" Motors was cancelled
in June, 1959 by reason of nonpayment of premiums, with
the notation that the firm was going out of business.
(R. 76) At the same time, a number of other policies of
insurance or bonds issued by appellant Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, and originally
written by the Motor Club Insurance Agency, were cancelled by reason of ((200" Motors' going out of business.
Prior to June 26, 1959, the Salt Lake City office of plaintiff advised City Finance Company, the loss payee under
the insurance policy, that plaintiff's draft in the amount
of $624.96 had been paid on the endorsement of Keith
Walton Body Shop and cc200" Motors and that a copy
of the draft would be forwarded to City Finance Company. (R. 23) The evidence shown in the letter of that
date is most convincing to prove that by June, 1959,
plaintiff had knowledge of questions regarding the authen-
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ticity of the endorsements on the draft. The substance
of the letter of June -26, 1959 is embodied in the Findings
of Fact, No.9. (R. 23)
The evidence is binding on plaintiff as well as defendant since the parties stipulated to the admission of
evidence, including letters, and to the truth of the dates
on which the letters were sent and other matters indicated therein except observations of the writer. In the
words of plaintiff's counsel, n • • • but the fact that the
letter was sent and the obvious facts connected with it
would be admitted by both parties.... " (R. 40) Since
plaintiff was unable at pre-trial to indicate the date on
which it had notice of the forgery, (R. 7), and the subsequent interrogatories were not pertinent, the letters referred to were admitted without objection to constitute
the evidence.
Plaintiff did nothing to pursue the inquiry demanded
by such knowledge as it possessed in June, 1959, and thus
failed in its duty to act at that time. Plaintiff must
nevertheless be charged with such knowledge as would
have been obtained upon inquiry, and with the consequences of failing to act. The duty to act was first for
the benefit of plaintiff itself, for if it suffered any loss
through a chain of events started by the forgery it should
have sought recovery against the forger. Plaintiff had
the further duty of informing Keith Walton and City
Finance Company of the forgery, to permit them to take
appropriate action if necessary. And most important,
plaintiff had the duty of informing defendant bank of the
forgery or of the questions relating to the endorsement, to
allow defendant ample opportunity for investigation and
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recovery against the forger in the event defendant became liable for any loss caused thereby.
It is absolutely clear that more than twenty-five
months (June, 1959, to July, 1961,) passed before defendant received any knowledge whatever of the forgery.
(R. 23, 25) No inquiry was made in 1959 of the Motor
Club Insurance Agency (R. 77), or of City Finance Company (R. 25). Even though Keith Walton denied receiving the draft or endorsing his business name thereon
before June 26, 1959, not until between January and
March of 1961 did plaintiff inquire about or request
samples of a signature of Keith Walton for comparison
with the alleged forgery. (R. 24) The plaintiff manifestly did nothing for many months, until pressed by
the City Finance Company attorney and until it was too
late to expect any recovery on the draft from the person
who received the proceeds therefrom. Such conduct is
the laches for which appellant must be held responsible.

The Utah Law governing laches is very clear on the
duty to inquire. In Burningham vs. Burke (1926) 60
Utah 90, 245 P. 977, the Court declared:
The law is well settled that a person cannot rescind
a contract for the purchase or sale of stock for
fraud either at law or equity if he has been guilty
of laches or of unreasonable delay, either in discovering the fraud, or in repudiating the contract
after its discovery, and, if there are facts which

ought to put a person of ordinary prudence on
inquiry, the purchaser will be charged with such
knowledge as would have been obtained upon such
inquiry. ... 0'rdinarily, whether laches exists is
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dependent upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case. While dela,y is an important
factor, yet mere delay, unless unreasonable or inexcusable, is not enough; and of equal importance are
the circumstances occurring during the delay, the
relation of the parties to the subject, disadvantages
that may hav(! come through the loss of evidence,
change of title, intervention of equities, or injury
from other causes. (emphasis added) (245 P. 983)
The doctrine of laches is an equitable defense not
controlled by any applicable statute of limitations, but is
really a matter of balancing equities between the parties,
Potash C01nPany of America vs. International Minerals
and Chemical Corporation (CCA lOth Circuit 1954)
213 Fed. 2d 153. In that case the Court sustained a
defense of laches in a patent infringement case. In
so doing it declared:
To constitute laches two elements must exist:
First, inexcusable delay in instituting suit and second, prejudice resulting to the defendant from
such delay. The existence of laches does not depend
merely upon the lapse of time, but also upon
the equities presented in the case. . . . But
ignorance will not of itself excuse delay. The
party must be diligent and make such inquiry
and investigation as the circumstances reasonably
suggest, and the means of knowledge are generally
equivalent to actual knowledge. (Citations)
In all of the following cases, the defense of laches
was upheld to defeat an attempt by the maker of a check
to recover against a collecting hank which had paid on
the forged endorsement of at least one payee, all of the
cases agreeing that the statute of limitations does not
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govern a defense of laches: National Bank of the Republic of Chicago vs. Kaspar American State Bank ( 19 38)
369 Ill. 34, 15 N.E. 2d 721; Goodyear Tire f5 Rubber Co.
of Calif. vs. First Nat. Bank of Denver (1934) 95 Colo.
34, 32 P. 2d 268; U. S. v. National City Bank of New
York (D.C. N.Y. 1939) 28 Fed. Supp. 144.
As to the second element of laches, or the detriment suffered because of plaintiff's failures, defendant
submits that it is clearly shown by the record. Alburn
Holder, dba ((200" Motors presented the draft for collection at the Brigham City office of respondent, and
received the value from the draft by reason of the credit
to its account with respondent. (R. 23)
On June 12, 1959, a warrant for the arrest of Alburn
Holder was issued, and within five days thereafter he
was taken into custody, a preliminary hearing was held,
and Holder was released on bond of $3,500.00 (R. 24,
Par. 10) Mr. Holder lived and worked in Atlanta,
Georgia, from the time he was released on bond until
shortly before February 8, 1960, at which time he was
sentenced and committed for thirty months. (R. 24)
Evidently, for a period of at least six months Mr. Holder
was working and earning money. He hired for his defense counsel in the criminal actions Mr. Joseph P. McCarthy, Salt Lake City, and paid him a retainer by cash.
(R. 74) The availability of cash from Mr. Holder
conclusively proves that defendant, had it been determined liable, could have obtained reimbursement of the
value of the forged draft, or at least part of the same,
had it been advised by plaintiff of the forgery during
those crucial months preceding February, 1960, when
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Mr. Holder was committed to a federal penitentiary.
That is all the prejudice defendant had to show, for it is
not necessary to prove that benefit would certainly have
accrued to the bank from an attempt to secure payment
from the forger, so long as the availability of the forger
was indicated. Union Trust Co. v. Soble (Md. 1949) 64
Atl. 2d 744.
No doubt can exist that defendant bank was prejudiced by plaintiff's failure to advise it promptly of the
forgery. Plaintiff must therefore be deemed guilty of
laches, and the judgment of the trial court can be affirmed on that basis.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED
PLAINTIFF'S MO·TION TO~ AMEND ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BASED ON THE AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT.
The trial court correctly concluded that City
Finance Company had been guilty of laches, and that by
reason thereof plaintiff had a valid defense to the claim
asserted against it which was not raised in the suit between those parties. (R. 27) This issue was discussed
by Court and counsel during argument (R. 96), and after
plaintiff declined the opportunity of calling witnesses
to testify on that issue (R. 100) the Court subsequently
based its judgment on that ground. Since plaintiff's motion to amend the Findings of Fact was granted, (R. 21)
the record as it stands must be taken as constituting the
complete evidence. Even if plaintiff itself were not
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guilty of laches, it ts charged with the laches of City
Finance Company.
The record clearly shows that prior to June 26,
1959, City Finance Company, the loss payee under the
policy issued by plaintiff, knew that Keith Walton Body
Shop had not received payment for the loss on the automobile, that the insurer had issued a draft payable to
Keith Walton Body Shop and u200" Motors, and that
Keith Walton denied ever receiving the draft or endorsing his name thereon. (R. 23, 24) Defendant submits
that such information is sufficient knowledge of the
forgery in and of itself. One of the incredible aspects
of the case is the fact that for many months City Finance
Company did not make any inquiries of plaintiff or of
any other party, failing in that regard as plaintiff itself
had failed. City Finance Company made no claim against
plaintiff until December 22, 1960, one and one-half years
after the knowledge of the forgery was almost certainly
possessed. (R. 24) And the City Finance Company
action to recover from plaintiff was not commenced until
October, 1961. (R. 25)
In thus failing to make any inquiry or investigation
for an unreasonably long period after it had knowledge
of the forged endorsement, City Finance Company deprived all parties from any opportunity to recover a loss
from the person who received the proceeds from the draft.
If City Finance Company had acted promptly after
June, 1959, the forgery could have been exposed very
quickly and whichever party suffered a loss could have
recovered all or part of the value of the draft from Alburn Holder of u200" Motors, who until at least January,
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1960, was working and earntng money tn Atlanta,
Georgia, ( R. 7 5 ) .
In accordance with those fa.cts, defendant submits
that the laches of City Finance Company must be
charged to Commercial Insurance Company in this action. The first reason therefor is privity between the
parties. In Meeks vs. MeekS (1944) 245 Ala. 559, 18 So.
2d 260, the Court held that generally speaking a plaintiff
may be barred from relief by the laches of one with whom
he stands in privity. See to the same effect, Williams Coke
Co. vs. Spears (19)8) 277 Ky. 57, 125 SW 2d 745.
In Gillons et al. vs. Shell Company of California
(CCA 9th Circuit 1936) 86 Fed. 2d 600, the Court sustained a decree dismissing a complaint alleging patent
infringements, on the ground that the laches of the plaintiff's predecessor in interest could be properly imputed
to plaintiff. That Court held:
At the outset, it will be helpful that we place our
inquiry into its proper setting. It must be borne
in mind that the decision of the trial court on the
subject of laches cannot be set aside unless it is
palpably wrong. (Citations)
As the decisions indicate, a question of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge,
and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal
unless it is so clearly wrong as to amount to an
abuse of discretion. ( 8 6 Fed. 2d 604)
Also, in Hart v. Northeastern N.M. Fair Ass'n. (1953)
58 N.M. 9, 265 P. 2d 341, the Court held that the trial
judge's decision on laches should be affirmed unless it
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is palpably wrong. In the case at bar no abuse of discretion can be shown in determining the laches of City
Finance Company, for the evidence in the record clearly
supports the judgment on that ground.
It is undisputed that City Finance Company and
Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey,
were in privity because of the contract of insurance
between them, and that plaintiff's alleged loss arose because it recognized that contract and reimbursed the loss
payee for an expenditure made on an insured automobile.
Although the cases cited above usually involved a grantorgrantee privity, the same rule would apply where the
loss of appellant occurred only by payment of a claim
to a contract privy, thereby ((buying" the right of action
from its predecessor. The appellant suffered no loss
whatever except by such payments. It would be grossly
unjust to allow recovery against the bank of an alleged
loss which plaintiff could have prevented by asserting a
valid defense. There was certainly no surprise on this
issue, for plaintiff admits that its counsel considered the
claim of City Finance Company and decided that it was
valid. (R. 25) Plaintiff's failure to raise a valid defense
then cannot prejudice defendant now.

Defendant further asserts that the laches of City
Finance Company was a valid defense which plaintiff
could have raised irrespective of whether such laches is
imputed to plaintiff in the legal sense, for if the delay
of City Finance Company in taking action on its knowledge of the forgery caused detriment to plaintiff, the loss
arising thereby could not be imposed on plaintiff. It
therefore paid City Finance Company as a volunteer,
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and without legal compulsion, and it cannot pass on to
defendant a loss so incurred. On either ground, the judgment of the trial court must be sustained.

POINT III.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WAS
PROPERLY DENIED SINCE BOTH PARTIES HAD
FULL OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
ON EVERY ISSUE AND THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED FULLY SUPPORTS THE JUDGMENT.
Plain tiff was not taken by surprise when the Court,
at the time of argument, discussed the issue of the laches
o£ City Finance Company. The record conclusively shows
that the issue was raised early in the trial when the Court
and counsel were discussing some exhibits introduced by
defendant:
The Court: I have looked at them. I take it all
he is trying to prove is that the records of the
City Finance show that as of a certain date the
City Finance Company knew there was a forgery
involved on this check.
Mr. Wadsworth: I see. I misunderstood. . . .
(R. 60)
Plaintiff surely cannot be surprised to learn it had
a defense to the claim of City Finance. The laches of
City Finance Company has been clearly shown from
the record in that it knew before June 26, 1959, that
Keith Walton denied having received the draft or endorsing his name thereon even though the draft had been
cashed on the purported endorsements of uzoo" Motors
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and Keith Walton Body Shop. (R. 23, 34) Yet City
Finance Company did nothing by way of further inquiry
or notification of any party until December 22, 1960,
nearly a year after opportunity for recovery from Alburn Holder was terminated by his imprisonment.
(R. 24)
Upon the close of evidence counsel for plaintiff was
awarded opportunity for opening the argument, even
though defendant had opened with proof. The following excerpts from the conversation between counsel and
Court indicate withol,lt question that counsel for both
parties were aware of the issues raised by the evidence
and that plaintiff had opportunity to offer new evidence
if it desired, but in reality had no more evidence to offer
since· the only witnesses plaintiff requested had already
been on the stand:
The Court: I thought when we started the only
thing we were going to have was a matter of
laches, but it seems to me there may be other
issues raised by the proof, and you may have the
first and last talk on this matter, Mr. Wadsworth.
(Argument by Mr. Wadsworth)
The Court: Let's see. If he can show laches, we
. don't need to bother about the other things. I
thought the knowledge had by your insured would
be knowledge that you would have and you would
stand in the identical boat of this insured. In fact,
if the insured waited an unreasonable time to
make his claim to you you ought not have paid
him. You should have said, ((Listen brother, I
can't recover from that other fellow because of
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laches, and I'm not going to pay you." If that
isn't the law, I ought to be advised about that now,
but I guess you are prepared about that, since that
was the question you had. (R. 96)
(Further argument by Mr. Wadsworth)

* * *
The Court: I want counsel to state for the record
what additional proof he would want to put in on
that, because if I am going to have additional
proof, you would need to make your argument
over, because I would forget it then anyway. What
would you need by way of continuance and proof
if I should rule against you in the matter of laches?
Mr. Wadsworth: If your Honor would rule
against me on the matter of laches, I am out.
(R. 98)

* * *
Mr. Wadsworth: Well, your Honor, I don't know
what the Court wants in this regard.
The Court: I don't want a thing. I just wondered
if the evidence had come in that scared you. If
you weren't scared, if there isn't anything to this
that I suggested, I probably will catch on to it
after a while. If you need time, you tell into the
record what time you need and what witnesses
you would expect to call. (R. 99)

* * *
Mr. Wadsworth: I see, your Honor. Well, I
would want to call-to recall Mr. Keith Walton
and the present manager of the City Finance
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probably subpoena the records of City Finance,
and possibly Mr. Wells of Fore Loyalty Group.
The Court: Well I wouldn't continue it for Keith
Walton. He was here. He testified, and he is the
boy that raised the problem.
Mr. Wadsworth: Your Honor, I was surprised on
this issue. I didn't know that that was an issue at the
time he was here, so I had no opportunity to crossexamine him on that point.
The Court: You had opportunity. He was here.
Mr. Wadsworth: That issue hadn't been raised
at that time your Honor.
Mr. Allen: The evidence raised the issue.
Mr. Wadsworth: We were still trying under this
issue of laches that the pre-trial order set out.
The Court: There is a rule of Court that says
regardless of what your issues are, your pleadings
are deemed to be amended to comply to proof.
When his proof came in, that raised, if it did, if
it raised an issue at all, it was raised by his testimony regardless of what the pleadings theretofor
had been. The present manager of the City
Finance, has he been on the stand today?
Mr. Allen:
Honor.

Yes.

That was Mr. Brooks, your

The Court: Well I guess you couldn't get a continuance on that ground. I will take the matter
under advisement on the evidence given. (R. 99,
100)
/
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It is most significant that the Court stated that
knowledge had by the insured (referring to City Finance
Company as loss payee) would be knowledge that the
insurer would have and the insurer would stand in the
identical boat of the insured, and that if the insured
waited an unreasonable time to make its claim the insurer
ought not to have paid him. That is the precise ground
upon which the Court later based its judgment. Evidently, plaintiff was not surprised by the issue. Plaintiff
must be bound by the evidence adduced at trial as contained in the present record. Defendant submits that no
prejudicial error was committed by the Court, and that
a new trial would serve no purpose whatever. The judgment of the trial court should be sustained and its refusal to grant a new trial affirmed.
POINT IV.
PLAINTIFF DID NO'T PROVE A CLAIM
AGAINST DEFENDANT UPON WHICH RELIEF
COULD BE GRANTED.
Several additional grounds for ·affirming the judgment may appropriately be noted in accordance with the
fundamental law that where the conclusion reached by
the trial court is correct, the judgment will be affirmed
on review irrespective of the trial court's reasons for the
judgment. Rasmussen vs. Davis (1953) 1 Ut. 2d 96,
262 P. 2d 488, Fisher vs. Bank of Spanish Fork (1937) 93
Ut. 514, 74 P. 2d 659, North American Accident Insurance Company vs. Tebbs (CCA lOth Circuit 1939) 107
Fed. 2d 853.
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As to the basic law governing plaintiff's right of
action against defendant, plaintiff has cited 7 Am. Jur.,
Banks, Sec. 594. That section also declares:
In a few cases, though, recovery from a bank on
a check received with a forged endorsement and
collected from the drawee bank has been denied
the drawer because of the particular circumstances.
Defendant submits that the facts of this case set
up the particular circumstances under which the drawer
should be precluded from recovering against the collecting bank which paid on the forged endorsement of one
of two payees.
The following cases deny recovery by a maker of a
check or draft against a collecting bank paying out on a
forged endorsement, on the grounds that no right of
action exists in the :first instance, or that payment by
the bank does not cause the loss to plaintiff: Provident

Savings Bank and Trust Co. vs. Fifth-Third Union Trust
Co. (1932) 43 Ohio App. 533, 183 NE 885; National
Surety Company vs. City Bank and Trust Company
(1945) 248 Wis. 32, 20 NW 2d 559; Trojan Publishing
Corp. vs. Manufacturers Trust Co. ( 1948) 298 N.Y. 771,
83 NE 2d 465.
It is clear from the record that Keith Walton had
not completed the repairs of the automobile at the time he
was informed that ((200" Motors had ((folded up" (R.
62) , and had done no more work prior to purchasing the
car from City Finance Company on November 19, 1959.
(R. 24) Keith Walton Body Shop was therefore not
entitled to the proceeds of the draft. Accordingly, City
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Finance Company was under no legal obligation to pay
Keith Walton Body Shop, but did so of its own accord
because he had the automobile in his possession and he
would not surrender it without being paid something
for whatever may have been done up to that point.
Plaintiff could have raised that defense, together with
the defense of laches, but failed to do either. Plaintiff's
contract with its loss payee did not compel it to pay invalid claims, or as a volunteer. Although the trial court
did not place its judgment on that particular ground,
the Court evidently felt that Keith Walton was entitled
to no money as shown by the following excerpts from
the record:
Mr. Wadsworth: There has been no showing that
there is anything close to laches.
The Court: Wait a minute. This non-suit works
both ways. You have moved for it, and it goes
against you as well as them. You agreed to something at the pre-trial that appears not to be so.
It appears Walton had not made the repairs and
did not make the repairs and that the man who
put his name on the check didn't owe Walton the
payments, so that ought to take you out, oughtn't
it?

::- * *

The Court: It seems to me this company did not
owe Keith Walton one dime. They put his name
on there to protect the insured, but they did not
owe Keith Walton, and Keith Walton couldn't
have sued them for any money. (R. 8 6, 8 8)
As a corollary principle, it must also be emphasized
that plaintiff in the first instance made the draft payable
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to u200" Motors (A loss payee under the policy) and to
Keith Walton Body Shop (to whom no duty was owed),
but failed and neglected to make the draft also payable
to City Finance Company (as loss payee to whom an
obligation was owed). City Finance Company as loss
payee was not included as a party on the draft because
of the recommendation of the independent insurance adjusting company, the Scott-Wetzel Company that a draft
for $624.96 be issued payable to H200" Motors and Keith
Walton Body Shop. (R. 67, 68) Mr. Wells, plaintiff's
employee, testified that in causing a draft to be prepared
for his signature he would ask the secretary to type it up
according to the information furnished by the adjusting
agency. (R. 82) Plaintiff thus left itself open for a claim
of the very nature involved in this action by failing to
protect the loss payee. Mr. Brooks, the manager of City
Finance Company, testified that the City Finance Company always looks to the insurance company for payment
of a loss and expects its name to be on the draft by reason
of its status as a loss payee. (R. 58) Plaintiff cannot
take advantage of its own negligence in asserting an alleged loss against defendant bank.

It is also clear that if Keith Walton were entitled
to money which he didn't receive because of a forgery
of his endorsement, he would be the real party in interest
against defendant bank, and not the plaintiff. The payee
whose endorsement is forged has the right of action
against a cashing bank. Esponda vs. Ogden State Bank
(1929) 75 Ut. 117, 283 P. 729.

The judgment of the trial court may thus be affirmed on one or more of several alternative grounds.
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CONCLUSIO·N
Plaintiff had knowledge of the forged endorsement
on its draft, or had knowledge of such facts as would have
led to conclusive discovery of the forgery if plaintiff had
not failed to pursue diligent inquiry, as early as June 26,
1959, some seven months prior to the date on which
Alburn Holder, the person benefitting from the forgery,
was last available for recovery against him. Plaintiff
failed to act either on its own behalf or in notifying defendant bank of the forged instrument until twenty-five
months later, thus depriving defendant of opportunity
to recover from Mr. Holder. In balancing the equities
between the parties, it clearly appears that plaintiff was
guilty of laches through an unreasonable delay resulting
in prejudice to the defendant.
Even if that were not so, City Finance COmpany, the
loss payee under plaintiff's policy of insurance, was guilty
of laches by its prejudicial failure to notify plaintiff of
the forged endorsement until all chance of recovery was
eliminated. City Finance COmpany had certain knowledge of the forgery prior to June 26, 1959, and waited
until December 22, 1960 before making demand on
plaintiff for the loss allegedly suffered. Such laches is
imputable to plaintiff by ·reason of the privity between
those parties. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to raise as
defenses to paying City Finance Company, the laches
of City Finance Company and its negligence in paying
Keith Walton Body Shop when it appeared he was not
entitled to the money.
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Plaintiff had full opportunity to present evidence
on every issue raised by defendant's evidence and considered by the Court, and therefore the trial court was
correct in denying a new trial.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed in
every respect.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Don B. Allen
300 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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